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I. Introduction: The Origins of a Brutal Diamond Trade
Few would guess the origin of the opulent diamond worn by
Hillary Clinton at her husband's Presidential Ball.' The fine, four-
carat gemstone hails from Former President Bill Clinton's
stomping grounds-Arkansas.2 In 1906, a farmer first stumbled
upon diamonds in Murfreesboro, Arkansas, while working in his
pigsty.3 Soon, what would become Hillary Clinton's diamond,
like more than 100,000 others, had been unearthed in Arkansas.'
The Arkansas diamonds rivaled the color and clarity of the world's
finest diamonds' and tipped scales, with masses of over 40 carats
I See JANINE ROBERTS, GLITTER & GREED 99 (2003).
2 See id at 99-100.
3 See id.
4 See id at 100; see also Slow to Dig Diamonds: Arkansas Geologist Called
Attention to Strata Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES, August 5, 1907, at 7 (reporting on the
discovery of diamonds in Pike County, Arkansas at a time at which only 140 had been
uncovered) [hereinafter Slow to Dig Diamonds].
5 See Good Diamonds in Arkansas: Prof Schneider Reports That the Field is as
Rich as Kimberley, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1907, at Al (stating that Professor Philip
Schneider, a Syracuse University geologist commissioned by the Department of
Agriculture, "reports that the surface indications are that this territory will equal the
famous Kimberley diamond fields in South Africa. The dirt, he reports, resembles in
every respect the soil in and around the Kimberley diamond tracts in South Africa.
'There can be no doubt,' he adds, 'that genuine diamonds have been obtained from the
Huddleston tract in [Arkansas]"'); see also Arkansas Diamonds Here: Maiden Lane
Pronounces Them Fine Specimens of the Gem, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1910, 8 ("Maiden
Lane's [the early center of New York's diamond district] experts admitted that the
Arkansas diamonds are equal to the best from South Africa or any other part of the
world .... [T]he development of the Arkansas field had been proceeding cautiously up
to this time, but ... results have been so favorable thus far that a complete mining plant,
similar to that of the De Beers Company, is about to be installed.").
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in some instances.6
Yet, despite reports that the Arkansas diamond deposits could
eclipse any known deposits in the world in both quality and
quantity,' major diamond players hesitated to introduce diamond
production in the United States for fear of diluting the market and
drawing attention to the atrocities of overseas diamond
operations.' Over the next half-century, every attempt to mine
diamonds in Arkansas was frustrated by misfortune, botched buy-
outs, and outright sabotage. 9 Eventually, the State of Arkansas
6 The "Uncle Sam Diamond" was unearthed weighing in at 40.23 carats and is
now owned by a diamond merchant in New York City. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at
102.
7 The discovery of Arkansas diamonds also was a popular topic for editorials
during its time. See, e.g., The Diamonds ofArkansas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1907, at 6
("There are pure white diamonds, yellow ones, and brown ones. Perhaps the field may
not turn out to be so very rich.. . . But the discovery of even a small diamond field
within our own territory is an event of importance. There must be others.").
8 See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 99-110. Even before their actual discovery, the
potential existence of diamonds in Arkansas was largely hushed. See Slow to Dig
Diamonds, supra note 4, at 7 ("State Geologist Branner called attention years ago to the
strata similarity and expressed the opinion that the presence of diamonds was indicated
in that portion of Pike County, and yet this valuable opinion was absolutely ignored.").
However, even the early, primitive attempts at mining in Arkansas garnered negative
publicity. See Arkansas Diamond-Mad: Pike County Farmers Hiding Away Tons of
Worthless Rock, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1907, at 6 ("In dozens of cases there are entire
families, not one member of which has any idea of what a diamond is, except that it can
be taken to the bank and traded for money, straggling over the hills day after day ....
You can see on nearly any part of the hill section of Pike County parties of men and
women, boys and girls, barefooted and bareheaded, scuttling through the brush with
wooden pails and apron loads of rock that is not fit even for making good roads.").
9 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 99-113. For example, in 1911, Thomas Cochran, a
J.P. Morgan partner with ties to major diamond companies, organized the purchase of a
controlling interest in the Arkansas Diamond Company. Mr. Cochran immediately
replaced the mine manager with S.H. Zimmerman, an associate of diamond magnate
Ernest Oppenheimer of De Beers. As soon as Mr. Zimmerman gained control of
operations, diamond production disintegrated to one hundredth of mine capacity,
allowing Mr. Zimmerman to condemn the mine as "hopeless" and close operations. Yet,
a subsequent investigation by the U.S. Justice Department found the mine rich with
diamonds, leading it to conclude that Mr. Zimmerman's "function appears to have been
to sabotage the mine." See id at 102-03. Later, on January 13, 1919, Howard A.
Millar's Murfreesboro diamond mining operation was destroyed by a series of arsonist
fires. Mr. Millar blamed the Diamond Syndicate, a major diamond mining company
conglomerate discussed supra, after learning that the syndicate had hired a pilot to
secretly take aerial photos of Mr. Millar's mining operation earlier on the day of fire.
See id. at 100. The arrival of the Great Depression cast the final nail in the coffin of the
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purchased the land and formed a public park, which still to this
day operates as a tourist attraction."o The diamond industry's
major players had successfully thwarted the threat of Arkansas
diamonds attracting domestic scrutiny and diluting the diamond
market. However, for an industry comprised of immensely
powerful and monopolistic entities, the elimination of diamond
production on American soil is only the tip of the iceberg.
De Beers may be the most recognized name in an industry
pitching everlasting love, but its original charter ominously
foreshadowed a much darker, conflict-ridden industry: it permitted
the company to "maintain a standing army, and undertake warlike
operations."" Operating under this charter, De Beers enjoyed a
virtual monopoly over the diamond production industry by
consistently controlling over eighty percent of the world's
diamonds for nearly a century after its founding. 2 This
exclusivity fostered an unparalleled level of trade secrecy that
continues to infect the industry, permitting "the long-standing
infection to go septic."" The opaque industry has even developed
its own means of dispute resolution to minimize outside influence
and to maintain secrecy. As one scholar explains:
[D]iamond industry disputes are resolved not through the courts
and not by the application of legal rules announced and enforced
by the state. The diamond industry has systematically rejected
state-created law. In its place, the sophisticated traders who
dominate the industry have developed an elaborate, internal set
of rules, complete with distinctive institutions and sanctions, to
handle disputes among industry members.14
As such, deeply engrained subterfuge has come to characterize the
Arkansas diamond industry. See id. at 105.
10 See Crater of Diamonds State Park, Murfreesboro, Ark.,
http://www.craterofdiamondsstatepark.com/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
11 IAN SMILLIE, BLOOD ON THE STONE 35 (2010).
12 See id. at 39.
13 Id. at 161.
14 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 116 (1992) (concluding that
"the transaction costs of entering into legally enforceable agreements cannot explain
diamantaires' preference for extralegal agreements and ... the norm of 'secrecy' that
pervades the industry is at least a partial explanation for diamond dealers' preference for
privately enforced agreements").
Vol. XXXIX888
2014 INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
diamond trade.
Janine Roberts investigated the history of the diamond industry
and discovered an illustrative dynamic: members of the pioneering
diamond syndicate, namely De Beers, were largely responsible for
the scarcity of diamonds.'" Ernest Oppenheimer, an early-20th
century controller of De Beers,16 increased the value of diamonds
by focusing on "buying up deposits, hiding deposits and limiting
production.""
These early diamond producers also exercised absolute control
over the profitable and prolific mines of southern Africa.'s
However, during the late 1920s, a number of alluvial'9 diamond
fields were discovered in South Africa, opening the profit-gates
for countless entrepreneurial miners-a serious threat to the
primary diamond producers' stranglehold on the market.20 In
response, a cohort of major players in the diamond industry
championed the Precious Stones Act of 1927,21 which prohibited
the possession of unregistered diamonds in South Africa and
provided that any such contraband would be seized and transferred
to the London Diamond Syndicate, the market controlled by De
Beers. 22 These examples of trade-commandeering form part of the
existing industry framework and help explain the difficulties
facing today's diamond trade.
15 See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 83-97.
16 Cecil Rhodes formed De Beers in 1880 and focused on absorbing as many
mines and companies as possible. Notably, despite devising the Rhodes Scholarship,
Rhodes is said to have shown his domineering aspirations by once admitting, "I would
annex the planets if I could." Nevertheless, by 1929, Ernest Oppenheimer had wrested
control of De Beers from Rhodes's legacy. See SMILLIE, supra note I1, at 35-40.
17 Id. at 83.
18 See SMILLIE, supra note I1, at 39-43 (discussing De Beers's sophisticated system
of controlling the diamond industry that allowed it to "wield[] absolute control over all
aspects of the rough diamond industry").
19 Alluvial diamonds are those located near the earth's surface that are more easily
accessed without heavy mining machinery. See discussion infra notes 167-189.
20 See, e.g., The Diamond Empire, PBS FRONTLINE 1994, available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s4c 1 pDMklw.
21 Precious Stones Act No. 44 of 1927 (S. Afr.).
22 See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 93.
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II. Diamonds Finance the Bloodshed
The diamond industry's efforts to artificially inflate the prices
of diamonds have had costly repercussions. Since the 1950s, the
enormous value of rough diamonds has incited countless violent
and bloody conflicts in Africa.23
[D]iamonds fuelled some of the most brutal wars in Africa.
More than three million people died as a result of these wars in
the 1990s and the early 2000s; many more millions of lives have
been damaged, and the existence of entire nations has been
called into question.24
Illicit diamonds have financed entire rebel movements.
Indeed, the illicit diamond trade financed Angola's Uniio
Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) to the
tune of $700 million annually and Sierra Leone's Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) with upwards of $125 million annually. 25 The
fungibility and enormous value of illicit diamonds simplified the
corruption of African governments by serving as a conduit for the
influx of cash that financed brutal civil wars.26 The end of the
Cold War worsened the issue because the diminished need for a
strategic foothold on the African continent caused a withdrawal of
foreign aid.27 Many African governments turned to diamonds as
an alternative source of revenue.28
As death tolls rose throughout the 1990s, several human rights
organizations recognized the need for action. 29 By the late 1990s,
a stream of reports and expos6s from non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) illuminated the atrocities and condemned
the diamond industry for causing the degradation.3 0 Media frenzy
23 See J. Andrew Grant, The Kimberley Process at Ten: Reflections on a Decade of
Efforts to End the Trade in Conflict Diamonds, in HIGH-VALUE NATURAL RESOURCES
AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 159, 161 (Pilivi Lujala & Siri Aas Rustad eds.,
2012).
24 SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 1.
25 See Grant, supra note 23, at 162.
26 See JOELLE BURBANK, THE FUND FOR PEACE, THE EFFECT OF THE KIMBERLEY
PROCESS ON GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION & INTERNAL CONFLICT 1 (2006).
27 Id
28 See id.
29 See Grant, supra note 23, at 162.
30 See GLOBAL WITNESS, A ROUGH TRADE: THE ROLE OF COMPANIES AND
GOVERNMENTS IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT (1998) [hereinafter A ROUGH TRADE]
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soon ensued,"1 and attention continued to grow with the release of
major Hollywood films such as Die Another Day3 2 and Blood
Diamond.3 3 In 2000, the United Nations (UN) took its first steps
in response by establishing an expert panel to monitor the illicit
diamond trade.3 4
The diamond industry, however, remained unfazed. Despite
the public outcry, Nicky Oppenheimer, Chairman of De Beers,
brazenly endorsed the manipulative nature of the diamond market
in a 1999 address at the Harvard Business School Global Alumni
Conference:
I am chairman of De Beers, a company that likes to think of
itself as the world's best known and longest running monopoly.
We set out, as a matter of policy, to break the commandments of
Mr. Sherman. We make no pretense that we are not seeking to
manage the diamond market, to control supply, to manage
prices, and to act collusively with our partners in the business.35
(identifying diamond companies' relationships with rebel groups and corrupt
governments in Angola); IAN SMILLIF, LANSANA GBERIE & RALPH HAZLETON,
PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, THE HEART OF THE MATTER: SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS &
HUMAN SECURITY (2000) (identifying diamond companies' relationships with rebel
groups and corrupt governments in Sierra Leone).
31 The BBC, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Vanity Fair were
among the media outlets that published articles based on the NGO reports. See Grant,
supra note 23, at 162.
32 DIE ANOTHER DAY (MGM 2002) (featuring a James Bond mission to sever the
link between a terrorist organization and a diamond mogul).
33 BLOOD DIAMOND (Warner Bros. Pictures 2006) (contrasting the struggles of an
activist, a diamond smuggler, and an enslaved diamond miner in Sierra Leone in the late-
1990s).
34 See id at 163.
35 Nicky Oppenheimer, Chairman, De Beers, Address at the Harvard Business
School Global Alumni Conference (March 1999), in DEBORA L. SPAR, MANAGING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT: CASEBOOK 220-23 (2003). Note, however,
that this single quotation may paint an unfair depiction of Oppenheimer's overall
willingness to engage the KP. In 2003, Oppenheimer acknowledged that the diamond
industry's support of the KPCS is critical to the redevelopment of post-conflict regions:
"To achieve this goal we need to engage with these countries, encouraging a return to
good governance, the rule of law, and sound fiscal policy in exchange for benign
investment." Nicky Oppenheimer, Chairman, De Beers, Royalty Bill Could Jeopardize
KP, Remarks at Kimberley Process Plenary Session Dinner in South Africa, (Apr. 29,
2003), in Sheryl Katz, Oppenheimer Upset Over New 8% SA Royalty Tax,
RAPAPORTDIAMONDS (Apr. 30, 2003, 9:05 AM); accord Andrew Bone, The Kimberley
Process Certification System: The Primary Safeguard for the Diamond Industry, in
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Oppenheimer's audacious mantra was indicative of an
industry, which, at the time of his speech, was "infected by
smuggling, tax invasion, money laundering, sanction-busting, war
and state collapse."36 Even this formal industry was operating on
the periphery of any authority by relying on "social ostracism or
reputational damage" to maintain stability." Meanwhile, an
estimated twenty-five percent of the world's total diamond trade,
representing upwards of $2 billion annually, was completely
illicit." The artificially inflated value of diamonds fueled
mercenaries, warlords, and rebel groups, allowing them to wreak
havoc and wage merciless wars in Africa-an estimated 3.7
million people have lost their lives as result.39 The stage was set
for an international response.
III.The Kimberley Process as a Starting Point
After a dozen fruitless meetings, a discordant group of NGOs,
politicians, state officials, and diamond industry executives
convened in Interlaken, Switzerland, to approve an agreement to
end the trade of conflict diamonds.40 The Kimberley Process (KP)
that resulted sought to eliminate the production and trade of
"conflict diamonds" by establishing an international certification
scheme for rough diamonds.4 1 In 2002, the KP, a coalition of
diamond-producing countries, members of the diamond trade, and
civil organizations,4 2 formulated the Kimberley Process
HIGH-VALUE NATURAL RESOURCES AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING, supra note 23,
at 193 (quoting Oppenheimer and highlighting need for industry collaboration).
36 SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 17.
37 Bernstein, supra note 14, at 133.
38 See SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 17.
39 GLOBAL WITNESS, FOR A FEW DOLLAR$ MORE: HOW AL QAEDA MOVED INTO
THE DIAMOND TRADE 8 (2003) [hereinafter For a Few Dollar$ More].
40 See SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 177-92 (describing the motley mix of attendees
as "ironic" due to their vastly different priorities and concerns); see also Jan Erik Wetzel,
Targeted Economic Measures to Curb Armed Conflict? The Kimberley Process on the
Trade in 'Conflict Diamonds', in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 161, 168-
69 (Noelle Qudnivet & Shilan Shal-Davis eds., 2010) (discussing various predecessor
efforts to create industrial self-regulation measures, including the establishment of the
World Diamond Council).
41 The Kimberley Process, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/about (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013).
42 The enormous role of NGOs in focusing global attention on the diamond
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Certification Scheme (KPCS). Currently, "the KP has 51
participants,43 representing 77 countries ... [which] account for
approximately 99.8% of the global production of diamonds."4
States may join the KP by demonstrating adherence to the primary
goals of KP through domestic regulation of the production and
trade of conflict diamonds. 45  The KP promotes compliance by
asking participants to trade diamonds only with other participating
members. 46  Essentially, the KP asks participants to monitor
mining and trading of rough diamonds within their borders and to
attach KPCS certificates to all rough diamonds prior to
importation or exportation.4 7
Since its implementation, the KPCS has had several positive
effects on diamond-producing countries. For instance, the KPCS
allows importing countries to increase revenues from export taxes
and leads some private actors to increase their supply chain
transparency.4 8 Many scholars guardedly agree that the KPCS also
contributes to post-conflict peace building.49
industry's maladies and the forming the KP cannot be understated. Notable activist
organizations included Global Witness, Partnership Africa Canada, Amnesty
International, Oxfam, World Vision, Fatal Transactions in Europe, ActionAid, and
Human Rights Watch. See SMILLIE, supra, note 11, at 176.
43 KPCS uses the term "participant" rather than "member," which is indicative of
the organization's forceless nature. See The Kimberley Process,
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/participants (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
44 Id. (emphasis added).
45 See Grant, supra note 23, at 163.
46 See Interlaken Declaration on Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for
Rough Diamonds, Nov. 5, 2002, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-
core-document; see also Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Nov. 5, 2002,
www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/Interlaken
%20Declaration%20(5-ll-2002).pdf.
47 The KPCS also contains a series of additional internal control functions, such as
requiring participants to designate importing and exporting authorities, requiring all
diamond shipments be contained in tamper-resistant containers, maintain relevant data
regarding trade of diamonds. KP participants create and produce their own certificates.
See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, available at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/node/l122.
48 See Harrison Mitchell, A More Formal Engagement: A Constructive Critique of
Certification as a Means of Preventing Conflict and Building Peace, in HIGH-VALUE
NATURAL RESOURCES AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING, supra note 23, at 197.
49 See, e.g., Wetzel, supra note 40, at 161 ("While not perfect, [the KP] is a good
example of how to address the economic basis of a conflict in order to influence the
decision-making process of the relevant warring stakeholders."); SMILLIE, supra note 11,
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However, there is no real means of enforcing the KPCS.
Rather, the system relies upon the respective parties to enforce the
KPCS's policies and requirements domestically."o Participants
then are expected to report back to the KP secretariat on a
quarterly basis with statistics on intrastate diamond production and
foreign diamond trade at their borders." Producing countries are
also encouraged to ensure all diamonds are produced from
licensed mines.5 2 However, the licensing of diamond mines has
been largely nonexistent in most diamond-producing African
states.53 Violations, although scarcely discovered, typically result
in the seizure of the shipment without further repercussions.54
According to a survey of participants, half of all participants admit
to having violated the KPCS since its implementation in 2003."
Beyond the litany of practical hurdles that continuously undercut
implementation, the KPCS has also encountered legal obstacles.
at 190 (posturing that, although "[tihe system was not perfect[,]" the KP "ma[de] it more
difficult in a hitherto unregulated industry, to exchange stolen diamonds for weapons");
Grant, supra note 23, at 176 ("Although the KP has experienced a great deal of success
over the past decade, it faces a number of challenges."); Clive Wright, The Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme: A Model Negotiation?, in HIGH-VALUE NATURAL
RESOURCES AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING, supra note 23, 159, 185-86 ("[The
KPCS] has gone a long way toward ending the scourge of the so-called blood
diamond . . . [but it] is not a perfect agreement.").
50 See Grant, supra note 23, at 164. The United States implements the KP through
the Clean Diamond Trade Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-19, 117 Stat. 631 (2003), as
discussed in Part 111.
51 In 2011, reports indicated that participants issued 53,962 KP importation
certificates and 54,585 exportation certificates, accounting for over $14 trillion in
diamonds produced. See Kimberley Process, Rough Diamond Statistics, Annual Global
Summary: 2011 Production, Imports, Exports and KPC Counts (2011), available at
https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.org/static/pdfs/publicstatistics/2011/2011 GlobalSum
mary.pdf.
52 See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Nov. 5, 2002, Annex II, if 9-10,
available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document.
53 See infra notes 222-243 (explaining how conceptions of property rights in
African countries differ from traditional western property rights principles, thereby
indicating why licensing has been difficult to implement).
54 See Grant, supra note 23, at 164.
55 See id.
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IV. Moving On: Abandoning the GATT Debate
During the drafting of the KPCS, the United States expressed
concerns about whether the system would comply with the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)," which is a
World Trade Organization (WTO)5 1 obligation.5 ' GATT, which
was formed to encourage equitable and open international trade,59
prohibits members of WTO from restricting trade to fellow
members under Article XI.60 Thus, Article XI and the KPCS
requirements appear facially inconsistent. In 2003, in response to
concerns that the legality of the KPCS could be challenged under
GATT, the WTO granted a temporary waiver of GATT
obligations to eleven member states, including the United States.6 1
In 2006, the waiver was extended for an additional six years.6 2
Just prior to its expiration on December 31, 2012, the waiver was
56 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1l , 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
57 The United States is one of 157 members of the WTO, which:
is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade
between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed
by the bulk of the world's trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The
goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers
conduct their business.
World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/whatis e.htm
(last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
58 See Wetzel, supra note 40, at 171.
59 See GATT, supra note 56, preamble.
60 See id. art. XI ("No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importations
of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale
for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.").
61 See Council for Trade in Goods, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, G/C/W/432/Rev. 1 (Feb. 24, 2003) (granting
waiver to Australia, Brazil, Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Sierra Leone,
Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and United States).
62 See Council for Trade in Goods, Extension of Waiver Concerning Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, G/C/W/559/Rev. 1 (Nov. 17, 2006)
(granting waiver to Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, India, Israel, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Chinese Taipei,
Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United States, and Venezuela).
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extended for yet another six years and expanded to incorporate
Russia. 63 The WTO's approach of repeatedly granting waivers has
created unnecessary suspense prior to each expiration date and, as
result, sparked a chorus of scholarly debate regarding KPCS's
legality.6 4 In any event, these waivers and prospective future
waivers are superfluous because the KPCS is exempt from GATT.
Despite clear, compelling arguments that the KPCS satisfies an
exception to GATT requirements, scholars continue to debate the
issue; yet, there is no sense in belaboring the point.65 Three GATT
exceptions justify a continuation of the KPCS waiver:66  (1) the
exception for the protection of "human, animal or plant life or
health" under Article XX(b); 67 (2) the public morals exception of
Article XX(a);6 8 and (3) the security exception under Article
XXI.1
63 See Council for Trade in Goods, Extension of Waiver Concerning Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, G/C/W/675/Rev.2 (Dec. 11, 2012)
(granting waiver to Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, European Union,
India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Russian
Federation, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey, United States, and Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela).
64 See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to
Make of the WTO Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds," 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1177 (2003)
(arguing that the WTO waiver excluding restrictions between KP participants is
unnecessary and possibly detrimental to international negotiations); Tracey Price, The
Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the Universality Debate,
12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (2003) (concluding that the KP's universality requirement
does not violate WTO obligations); Karen E. Woody, Diamonds on the Souls of Her
Shoes: The Kimberley Process and the Morality Exception to WTO Restrictions, 22
CONN. J. INT'L L. 335 (2007) (analyzing the validity of the KP waivers under WTO
obligations).
65 See Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L.
689, 729-30 (1998).
66 The chapeau of the Article XX presents a preliminary inquiry: Can the
regulation be deemed discriminatory? However, because the KP is a voluntary
multilateral agreement and available to any willing entity, this preliminary inquiry is
satisfied. See Wetzel, supra note 40, at 172; see also Price supra note 64, at 55; accord
Pauwelyn, supra note 64, at I 177.
67 GATT, supra note 56, art. XX(b) (providing that so long as measures are not
applied in a manner which is "arbitrary or unjustifiable[,]" members may take measures
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health").
68 Id. art. XX(a) (providing that so long as measures are not applied in a manner
which is "arbitrary or unjustifiable[,]" members may take measures "necessary to protect
public morals").
69 Id. art. XXI (stating that members may take "any action which it considers
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A. Article XX(b) 's Exception for the Protection of "Human,
Animal or Plant Life or Health" Applies to the KPCS
The KP is justifiable as necessary to protect human life under
Article XX(b). The inescapable link between illicit diamonds and
bloodshed is well-documented. Moreover, the UN's recognition
of the link and subsequent endorsement of the KP demonstrates
the legitimacy of the KPCS as a plausible response to the
atrocities.71  Therefore, "[e]ven if the KP were determined to be
inconsistent with GATT Article XI, or another provision, the
implementing legislation of Participants would qualify as a general
exception under Article XX(b) of the GATT."72
However, it is worth noting that the KPCS regulates the trade
of rough diamonds, which encompasses more than conflict
diamonds.7 ' Thus, the KPCS is arguably overinclusive and not
sufficiently tailored to qualify as necessary to protect human life
under Article XX(b). 74  As such, some scholars suggest the
morality exception under Article XX(a) as a more appropriate
defense.75
B. Article XX(a) 's Morality Exception Applies to the KPCS
An interpretation of jurisprudence arising from challenges to
other GATT exceptions suggests that the morality exception may
cover issues regarding "slavery, weapons, narcotics, liquor,
pornography, religion, compulsory labor, and animal welfare."
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests").
70 See reports and expos6s by NGOs and media outlets, discussed supra note 42.
71 See Price, supra note 64, at 53.
72 Id
73 See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 46, sec. III ("Each
Participant should ... ensure that no shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or
exported to a non-Participant."). See generally Paul Armstrong, What are 'Conflict
Diamonds?,' CNN (Dec. 5, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12-05/africa/world
africa conflict-diamonds-explainer I world-diamond-council-marange-conflict-
diamonds? s=PM:AFRICA (comparing conflict diamonds, which are those "illegally
traded to fund conflict in war-torn areas, particularly in central and western Africa[,]"
with rough diamonds, which are diamonds that "have recently been extracted and not yet
cut").
74 See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 46, sec. III.
75 See, e.g., Woody, supra note 64, at 353-55.
76 See Charnovitz, supra note 65, at 729-30.
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Since GATT's inception in 1947, no WTO member has challenged
an import ban based on the morality exception."
In the GATT context, there is a distinction between goods that
are considered intrinsically immoral (e.g., child pornography) and
goods that are produced by immoral means (e.g., textiles produced
by child labor or slavery). 78 The regulation of rough diamonds is
more akin to the regulation of products produced by child labor:
the means of production are deleterious, while the product-
diamond-is not intrinsically immoral. Yet, restrictions on
products produced by child labor are far more narrowly tailored as
they apply only to products directly produced by children, whereas
the regulation of rough diamonds applies to both conflict
diamonds and legitimately produced rough diamonds.79
Nevertheless, given the depth of support for regulating diamonds,
the lack of viable alternatives, and the extensive empirical data
tying conflict diamonds to human rights violations, "it is unlikely
the exception based on a morality determination that challenges
restrictive legislation made in compliance with the KP will be
challenged."so
C. Article XX7's Security Exception Applies to the KPCS
Lastly, KPCS is justifiable under the security exception of
Article XXI. Although the security exception is rarely invoked,
the KPCS "fits squarely within the good-faith meaning of Article
XXI.""' The exception permits the regulation of goods that either
"directly or indirectly. . . [supply] a military establishment."8 2
The evidence of illicit diamonds funding militant organizations
throughout sub-Saharan Africa is staggering.83 In Angola, for
77 Id. at 731.
78 See Woody, supra note 64, at 353-54.
79 See id
80 Id. at 354.
81 Price, supra note 64, at 60.
82 GATT, supra note 56, art. XXI (b)(ii).
83 See A ROUGH TRADE, supra note 30, at 4 ("Between 1992 and 1998 UNITA
obtained an estimated minimum revenue of US$3.72 billion from diamond sales."); see
also id. ("In 1995 Angola's total diamond output raised about US$700 million, according
to industry sources, of which only US$147 million was accounted for by legal sales ...
most of the rest was mined by UNITA and smuggled out unofficially.") (quoting
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT, 4TH QUARTER (1996)); CHRISTIAN
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example, the UNITA was known to net over $1 million on
diamond exports in a single day.84
In addition, soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, reports indicated that the terrorist organization al-Qaeda"
was heavily funded by the illicit diamond trade; in the three years
leading up to the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda's illicit diamond
profits may have reached tens of millions of dollars.8 6 In fact, al-
Qaeda and various other known terrorist organizations, such as
Hezbollah," have been reaping millions of dollars in the illicit
diamond trade for decades." Global Witness, an NGO, called
upon the KP to address terrorist financing after concluding that the
diamond industry and governments had concealed the connections
between illicit diamonds and terrorism for decades.89 Some
research indicates that the illicit diamond trade continues to be a
primary source of funding for major terrorist organizations."
Furthermore, the UN consistently incorporates and supports
the KP in its work, and Article XXI recognizes compliance with
international security obligations pursuant to UN membership as
grounds for the exception.9 1 As such, there is a strong empirical
basis for permitting KPCS under the Article XXI exception.9 2 In
DIETRICH, PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, HARD CURRENCY: THE CRIMINALIZED
DIAMOND ECONOMY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND ITS NEIGHBOURS
(2002) (linking civil wars in Central Africa to the massive illicit trade in conflict
diamonds).
84 See SMILLIE, supra note I1, at 66; see also supra notes 23-39.
85 See Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade: Sale of Gems from
Sierra Leone Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2001, at Al.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.; see also For a Few Dollar$ More, supra note 39, at 20. The Global
Witness report also reasons that al Qaeda likely gained an understanding of gemstone
trading while battling the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s; gemstones were often
traded by both sides during the conflict. See id at 14.
89 See For a Few Dollar$ More, supra note 39, at 27.
90 See, e.g., SMILLIE, supra, note 11, at 133-46 (describing a long-standing and
deeply entrenched network of arms dealers, terrorists, and rebel groups).
91 See GATT, supra note 56, art. XXI(c) (stating that the Agreement shall not
"prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and
security").
92 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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fact, during early KP negotiations, the European Commission and
Switzerland both argued that Article XXI eliminated the need for
any waiver of GATT obligations.93
As result, the argument for abandoning the GATT debate is
dynamic and sound, and "the general conclusion is that the waiver
was only declaratory." 94  The widespread support for rough
diamond regulation, the applicability of multiple GATT
exceptions, and the apparent willingness of the WTO to grant a
(superfluous) waiver of GATT demonstrate the gratuitous nature
of KP legality debates. 95  Accordingly, concerns over WTO
compliance must not impede the development of a more effective
response to the illicit diamond trade.
V. Shortcomings of the Kimberley Process
Although the KPCS's legality is on firm-footing, the KP is
failing to effectively promote stability in Africa's diamond
regions. In June 2009, Ian Smillie of Partnership Africa Canada
(PAC), a KP civil representative who was instrumental in its
creation, resigned, stating he "[could] no longer in good faith
contribute to a pretense that failure is success."9 6 In 2010, Dr.
Andr6 A. D. Jackson, Chairman of the African Diamond Council
(ADC) and another key architect of the KP, announced the ADC's
withdrawal, because the KP "routinely facilitated corruption in
Africa's diamond industry and ... the existing system encourages
brutal human rights violations by continuing to certify and
disguise illicit diamonds."97 A year later, Global Witness, another
founding member of the KP, also abandoned it, citing the KP's
"refusal to evolve and address the clear links between diamonds,
violence and tyranny" and lamenting that "most of the
governments that run the scheme continue to show no interest in
93 See Wetzel, supra note 40, at 172.
94 Id. at 173.
95 See supra note 49, 61-69 and accompanying text.
96 Credibility of Kimberley Process on the Line, Says NGOs, IRIN (June 22,
2009), http://www.irinnews.orgiReport/84949/GLOBAL-Credibility-of-Kimberley-
Process-on-the-line-say-NGOs (quoting Ian Smillie's June 19, 2009 resignation letter).
97 Press Release, African Diamond Council, African Diamond Council States
Position On Kimberley Process (June 21, 2010), available at http://www.i-
newswire.com/ReleasePrint/44392.
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reform."98
The increasingly massive costs of waging a largely ineffective
war on the illicit diamond trade fueled the discontent. As Smillie
points out:
The cost of dealing with the diamond wars has been enormous.
UNMIL, the UN peacekeeping force that was established in
Liberia in 2003, grew to absorb a budget of $560 million in
2009-10. The peacekeeping once in Sierra Leone cost $2.8
billion by the time it ended operations in 2005. The annual cost
of the peacekeeping force in CMte d'Ivoire was half a billion
dollars a year in 2009-10, and in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, MONUC was running a $1.35 billion dollar 12-month
budget over the same period.. . . At something between $2.3
and $4 billion a year, not counting the peacekeeping efforts in
Angola, it has taken a great deal of money and troops to control
the fires that were fuelled by diamonds. 99
The KPCS's overly accommodating and timid founding
document is partly to blame for the KP's weaknesses.' 0 The
underlying purpose of the KPCS yielded to individual interests;
most weaknesses "were deliberate efforts to limit the cost and
possible intrusion of the KP into national regulatory systems and
the international diamond trade."'0 ' As a result, the KPCS suffers
from a host of defects that must be addressed, including: (1) its
lack of any means to enforce its provisions; (2) its character as a
non-binding, voluntary arrangement that is easily disregarded; (3)
its illogical voting system that hinders KP progress; and (4) its
reliance on ill-equipped, post-conflict states to enforce the KPCS
through domestic legislation is an idealistic fool's errand.
98 Press Release, Global Witness, Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process,
Calls for Diamond Trade to be Held Accountable (Dec. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/KPexity.pdf.
99 SMILLIE, supra note I1, at 195-96.
100 See IAN SMILLIE, DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FOR INTERNATIONALE
ZUSAMMERARBEIT, ASSESSMENT OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS IN ENHANCING
FORMALIZATION AND CERTIFICATION IN THE DIAMOND INDUSTRY-PROBLEMS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 1 (2011) [hereinafter PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES].
101 Id.
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A. The KP Lacks Any Real Means ofEnforcing the KPCS
The KP is not a true international organization as it lacks a
permanent body.10 2 The customs officials of volunteer member
states, who are poorly paid, scarce, and easily corrupted, are
responsible for enforcing the domestic policies implementing the
KPCS." Therefore, those tasked with ground-level enforcement
are often unable to do so.
States must also consent to monitoring of domestic procedures,
leaving the current peer review mechanism without real
authority.'0 4 For example, in 2008, Venezuela simply refused to
permit a review of its diamond production after failing to produce
any of the "required" data since 2005.105 In outright mockery of
the KP, Venezuela declared that it would remain a member of KP,
but would forego the KPCS requirements for a couple years."0 As
one scholar argues:
Venezuela, a country that annually produces an estimated
150,000 carats of diamonds, has officially exported none since
January 2005. Although it is a member of the [KPCS] for
controlling rough diamonds, it has essentially dropped off the
KPCS radar .... Venezuela should be expelled from the KPCS
if the Kimberley Process wishes to maintain any semblance of
order and integrity.' 07
Despite Venezuela's apparent indifference to the KPCS, the
country received no penalty and remains a member of the KP.os
102 See Interlaken Declaration on Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for
Rough Diamonds, supra note 46.
103 See Wetzel, supra note 40, at 174.
104 See id.
105 See id. at 175.
106 See id.; accord SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 200 (describing a later KP visit to
Venezuela which revealed "that nothing had changed. [B]latant illegal [diamond]
traffic ... continued. [ Yet,] [t]he [KP] sat on its hands, effectively ignoring diamond
smuggling. Incredibly, the institution that had been designed to halt diamond smuggling
was now condoning it").
107 THE DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT, PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA,
THE LOST WORLD: DIAMOND MINING AND SMUGGLING IN VENEZUELA 1 (2006)
(describing how a change in ministerial duties left a vacancy for signing KPCS
certificates, yet "[i]n the 18 months since, no one in Venezuela's government has
seemingly had the will or interest to change two words on the appropriate government
document and put it in front of a minister to be signed").
108 See id.
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Even when peer reviews did proceed, they were often
ineffective. In 2008, a KP peer review team visited Guinea, which
had just reported a highly suspicious 600-percent increase in
diamond production.' 09  Concerns were heightened because
Guinea borders Cate d'Ivoire's rebel-controlled diamond mines"o
and because numerous reports document the ease of smuggling
diamonds from Guinea."' Yet, despite the telltale signs of a
sizeable illicit diamond trade, the KP peer review team stayed for
two hours before departing the country.1 2 The team then took
eleven months to produce a meager report that could not support
sanctions."' Like Venezuela, Guinea remained a member of the
KP. The review delicately concluded, "Guinea could take steps to
improve compliance with the [KPCS]."" 4
Only a few months after the KP review team left Guinea, the
KP faced another test when Zimbabwean soldiers gunned down as
many as 200 diamond miners near the Mozambique border."' The
massacre, an apparent attempt by the Zimbabwe Air Force to curb
unapproved diamond trading, eventually produced another KP
review." 6 Despite generating extensive evidence of human rights
abuse and KPCS noncompliance, the KP review generated a
recommendation that Zimbabwe be provided with technical
assistance and guidance."
As Venezuela, Guinea, and Zimbabwe's disregarded
transgressions indicate, the absence of enforcement leaves the
109 See SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 199.
110 See id.
III See PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA ET AL., REPORT TO THE 2010 KPCS PLENARY,
DIAMONDS WITHOUT BORDERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING
AND ENFORCING THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SYSTEM (2010) ("A range of
actors in Guinea's diamond industry informed the UN Group of Experts that they were
easily able to 'insert diamonds into the market in Guinea and export them legally with a
Guinean KP certificate.' Guinean officials also informed the UN Group of Experts 'that
the country lacks an effective system of warranties . .. [,] does not have inspectors at
mining sites and has porous borders."').
112 See SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 199.
113 See id.
114 See KIMBERLEY PROCESS, ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION ON GUINEA (Nov. 6,
2009), http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2009-administrative-decision-guinea.
115 See SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 201.
116 See id.
117 See id.
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KPCS ripe for abuse and neglect. Accordingly, in order to permit
true progress, the means of enforcement must be revamped.
Members should face a simple choice: either comply with
regulations and enjoy the benefits of membership or leave.
B. Nonbinding "Soft Law" Is Inherently Weak
The KPCS's chosen language also contributes to its
impotency. Like a "corporate social responsibility" initiative,
KPCS membership is voluntary and regulatory measures are only
recommendations."' The product of these components is a non-
binding, voluntary agreement-not an international treaty." 9 This
irresolute dynamic indulges noncompliance and facilitates
distancing from the underlying goals of the KP.12 0
Compare, for example, the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering (FATF). The FATF is an inter-governmental
organization that issues standards to participant countries to
combat money laundering and terrorist financing.'2 ' Although the
FATF lacks international legal authority over its members, it
ensures compliance with its measures by expelling any member in
noncompliance.'2 2 The FATF's framework also provides
beneficial features such as (1) early warnings to allow members to
address compliance issues; (2) increased transparency, making all
assessments fully public; and (3) retaining independent experts to
perform the assessments.123  Additionally, the FATF's efficiency
in quickly processing assessments and issuing sanctions further
bolsters its credibility and efficacy.124
I18 See Wetzel, supra note 40, at 175.
119 See id.
120 See THE WORLD BANK, NATURAL RESOURCES AND VIOLENT CONFLICT: OPTIONS
AND ACTIONS 222 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., 2003) (concluding that voluntary
instruments "frequently lack accountability through independent auditing and
enforcement [and] are also unlikely to act as a deterrent, unless clearly linked to market
incentives") [hereinafter OPTIONS AND ACTIONS].
121 See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO FATF AND ITS WORK
2(2010).
122 See Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and Its
2008 Lawyer Guidance, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 3, 5-9 (2010).
123 See Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting
the Financing of Terrorism Regulation Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance
Determinants in International Law, 31 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 137, 155-79 (2011).
124 See id. at 187.
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If the KP is to effect lasting change, it too must enforce
compliance. An independent monitoring body must be
established.125  Members should be expelled for noncompliance.
Review visits must be mandatory and responsive.126 The currently
gossamer structure could solidify by engaging with the UN and
evolving into an international organization capable of
implementing sanctions.127 Additionally, the creation of a private
right of action permitting individual members to challenge non-
compliant members would incentivize compliance and ease
trepidation associated with joining a more forceful agreement.12 8
C. A Nonsensical Veto Arrangement Retards KP Progress
The KP requires unanimity for all measures; thus, "generally
no vote is taken on contentious issues." 29 This "one man-one veto
arrangement" cripples the KP's progress.' In fact, the KP has
only sanctioned one member,"' and "[s]ince then, the KP's
requirement for 100% consensus on all decisions has meant that
no punitive action could be taken, even in the most obvious cases
of non-compliance."' 32
Moreover, the veto arrangement permits members to
selectively omit information from reports to the UN General
Assembly.'33 The effect of this reporting oddity is notoriously
exemplified by the 2009 Annual Report to the UN General
125 See supra note 123 and accompanying note (suggesting that if KP is to work
just as effectively as FATF, a monitoring body should be established).
126 See WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION
SCHEME THIRD-YEAR REVIEW (2006) (noting the importance of review visits).
127 See supra note 124 and accompanying note (implying that the ability to issue
sanctions bolsters credibility).
128 See Julie L. Fishman, Is Diamond Smuggling Forever? The Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme: The First Step Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood
Diamond Trade Problem, 13 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 217, 235 (2005).
129 See Wetzel, supra note 40, at 176.
130 SMILLIE, supra note I1, at 197-98.
131 In 2004, the peer review system revealed a major influx of diamonds in the
Republic of Congo. The Republic of Congo borders the Democratic Republic of Congo,
a major source of conflict diamonds. When the Republic of Congo failed to provide any
justification for its voluminous exports, KP members unanimously voted to suspend it.
See SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 199.
132 PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 100, at 2.
133 See SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 201.
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Assembly, which failed to acknowledge the target year's
disastrous affairs in Venezuela and Zimbabwe after the two
member-countries vetoed any mention of their respective
failures.'3 4
The KP's systemic inability to discipline members engaging in
egregious noncompliance also exacerbates the frustration of KP
members.' A battalion of commentators argue that the current
veto arrangement must be replaced by a workable voting
system. 3 6 A majority voting system would help breathe new life
into the KPCS by providing it with the teeth it desperately needs.
D. Domestic Controls are Unreliable
While states with relatively stable infrastructures, such as the
United States,'37 may implement the KPCS with ease,
underdeveloped states and those emerging from conflict may
struggle to do so.13 8  Currently, the KP relies upon standard
intercessional consultations with wayward members that are
simply perfunctory.'39 This effectively condones known violations
and, moreover, allows the dereliction to become endemic.'4 0
In addition to the abovementioned incidents in Guinea,
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe,141 C6te d'Ivoire, due to political
134 See id. at 201-02 ("The one man-one veto arrangement meant that only good
news would be taken to the General Assembly.").
135 See Grant, supra note 23, at 176 (discussing the noncompliance of Venezuela
and Zimbabwe); see also discussion infra Part V.D.
136 See Grant, supra note 23, at 176 ("Because it operates by consensus, the KP has
been unable to act swiftly when the need arose .... ); see also SMILLIE, supra note 11,
at 203 ("[The KP] needs to end its nonsensical veto arrangement and replace it with a
voting system."); Bone, supra note 35, at 192 (calling for "[a] move away from
consensus to a system of majority voting . .. [to avoid] inertia and politicization . .
Wetzel, supra note 40, at 176.
137 The United States passed the Clean Diamond Trade Act following the 2003
waiver of GATT. The Act enforces the provisions of the KPCS with the threat of civil
and criminal penalties. See Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3901 (2003).
138 For example, in Liberia, only 6/100 of border crossing points are manned by
authorities. See KIMBERLEY PROCESS, DECLARATION ADOPTED BY THE MOSCOW
PLENARY MEETING, IMPROVING INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER ALLUVIAL DIAMOND
PRODUCTION (Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2005-
administrative-decision-moscow-declaration-alluvial-diamond-production.
139 See Grant, supra note 23, at 176.
140 See id
141 See discussion supra notes 102-136.
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turmoil, is policed by untrained, underfunded, and inexperienced
law enforcement.14 2  Since 2002, Cte d'Ivoire has banned the
exportation of diamonds.143 Nevertheless, due to ongoing political
and civil instability, Cte d'Ivoire diamonds continue to flood into
neighboring countries.144 Ground-level implementation efforts are
simply nonexistent due to the lack of any governance in diamond-
mining areas of C6te d'Ivoire.'45 Indeed, the CMte d'Ivoire
government is still reliant upon UN peacekeepers and French
military troops to support rebuilding the nation's infrastructure.14 6
However, regions in conflict are not alone in their toil to
enforce KPCS measures. Liberia, despite maintaining stability
since 2005,47 continues to see massive amounts of illicit diamond
exports; only six of the 100 border entry points are even
manned.148  Liberia's and Cte d'Ivoire's combined lack of
enforcement, and the resulting spread of illicit diamonds, is the
product of nations ill-suited to implement their own legislative
KPCS initiatives. 14 Such actions, or more commonly inactions,
are products of a system that delegates enforcement to regions that
"lack resources, capacity, and political will" necessary for
enforcement.1o The KP, therefore, desperately needs a more
reliable means of implementing, enforcing, and controlling the
KPCS.
142 See BURBANK, supra note 26, at 3.
43 Id.
144 See id at 4.
145 See id. at 3.
146 See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2013, COTE
D'IVOIRE, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
iv.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
147 See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2013, LIBERIA,
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/i.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
148 See Bocar Thiam, Panelist, Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Regards to
ASM Formalization (June 8, 2012), in NOTES ON THE PROCEEDINGS, June 2012, at 8
[hereinafter NOTES ON THE PROCEEDINGS].
149 See BURBANK, supra note 26, at 3-4.
150 See Mitchell, supra note 48, at 195.
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VI. Addressing Underlying Design Defects
Ian Smillie, one of the frustrated architects of the KP, forlornly
branded the KP an "ineffective circus."'" Nevertheless, Mr.
Smillie maintains that not all hope is lost. 15 2  However, to
accomplish its purpose, the KP must first address the underlying
design flaws that belie its authority and impede its progress.'
This requires reorganization with a refocused commitment to its
fundamental purpose, a permanent review structure, the ability to
enforce sanctions, and a viable voting structure. 154 One potential
avenue for addressing these concerns would be for the KP to link
itself to other, already-established regulatory frameworks.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), for
example, boasts a coalition of private companies, NGOs, and
governments that oversees and enforces a global standard for the
extraction of oil, gas, and minerals.1 5' Like the KP, the EITI is
implemented by the member-states; however, unlike the KP, the
EITI's board operates at the international level and ensures
domestic compliance.156  The EITI, although voluntary, obligates
membership reporting and then systematically authenticates the
reports.' In other words, membership is contingent upon full
compliance with EITI standards.' Some commentators have
even called for an international forum to explore the prospect of
integrating EITI and the KP.159 At a minimum, the EITI, like the
151 SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 202.
152 See generally PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 100 (analyzing
inconsistencies and defects in the KP and identifying recent mineral regulatory initiatives
as possible partners to the KP).
153 See id. at I (suggesting the need to address design issues).
154 See, e.g., id at 1-3 (noting areas of improvement such as the ability to enforce
sanctions).
155 See EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, EITI RULES, 2011
EDITION 35 (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://eiti.org/document/rules.
156 See Eddie Rich & T. Negbalee Warner, Addressing the Roots of Liberia's
Conflict Through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, in HIGH-VALUE
NATURAL RESOURCES AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING, supra note 23, at 201.
157 See EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 155, at 35.
158 Id.
159 See Bernard Taylor, Panelist, Going into Action (June 8, 2012), in NOTES ON
THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 148; Alfred Brownell, Panelist, Diamond Revenue
Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms for Mining Communities' Beneficiation
from Revenues (June 8, 2012), in NOTES ON THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 148; accord
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FATF,160  presents a model for increasing efficacy of an
international framework. The KP should strive to develop a
similar framework applicable to the KPCS.
Alternatively, amending the Dodd-Frank Actl61 to include
diamonds would escalate pressure for a KP reform.162 On August
22, 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
finalized measures to enforce an innocuous provision of the Dodd-
Frank Act that requires entities to disclose any trade in conflict
minerals.163 Although the Act's definition of "conflict materials"
covers tantalum, columbite, tungsten, wolframite, and other
minerals, it conspicuously overlooks diamonds.164  The oversight
is due to Congress's misplaced assumption that the KP was
already addressing the trade of conflict diamonds.'6 ' Given the
existing regulatory framework and experience of the SEC, KP
objectives could be advanced by amending the Dodd-Frank Act to
include conflict diamonds, or by using the regulation as evidence
for the need of KP reform.16 6
VII. The Illicit Stream of Alluvial Diamonds
Beyond addressing design and enforcement defects, the KP
must refocus its efforts to curb the trade of illicit diamonds. For
decades, much of the criticism of the diamond industry has
focused on the role of major corporations and excavation
companies.167  In addition, pop culture has consistently
Wetzel, supra note 40, at 179.
160 See discussion supra notes 118-128.
161 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. Ill-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
162 PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 100, at 5 ("The threat that this might
become a requirement through the addition of diamonds to the Dodd-Frank Act might
persuade the [KP] to take the action that has so long been missing . . . .").
163 See Obiamaka P. Madubuko & Adam M. Taylor, New SEC Rules Target
Conflict Materials, CFO (Aug. 28, 2012), ww2.cfo.com/supply-chain/2012/08/new-sec-
rules-target-conflict-minerals-supply-chains/; Nick Elliott, Conflict Minerals Rules
Could Reverberate Through Supply Chain, THE WALL ST. J.: CORRUPTION CURRENTS
(Sept. 14, 2012, 9:01 AM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2012/09/14/conflict-minerals-rules-could-reverberate-through-supply-chain/.
164 See Dodd-Frank, supra note 161, § 1502(4), 124 Stat. 2218 (2010).
165 See PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 100, at 5.
166 See id.
167 See generally ROBERTS, supra note 1 (explaining how diamond merchants and
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exacerbated the isolated public perception that the diamond
industry revolves around the uncovering of large, priceless
diamonds. 16 8  However, in some regions, ninety-nine percent of
diamonds produced are classified as alluvial."' Moreover, the
vast majority of the illicit diamond trade does not arise from large-
scale diamond operations producing weighty gems; rather, conflict
diamonds "are almost exclusively 'alluvial' diamonds."'7 0  To
avoid becoming obsolete, the KP must refocus its efforts to
effectively address the root problem: alluvial diamonds.
Alluvial diamonds are formed under the same processes as any
diamond, but, unlike those unearthed at major mining operations,
alluvial diamonds are located near the earth's surface.' 7' Over
time, whether by natural erosion or the movement of glaciers, the
kimerlitel 72 pipes containing diamonds deteriorate and become
exposed.173  The alluvial diamonds are then easily accessible
without heavy equipment, which permits countless individuals to
engage in small-scale mining with little capital expenditure.174
Despite their abundance, these small-scale miners are
generally defenseless and vulnerable to exploitation.175  Indeed,
corporations reap billions of dollars of profits from major mining operations); SMILLIE,
supra note 11 (describing the diamond production industry as the "great diamond cartel"
and denouncing the relentless pursuit of diamond profits).
168 See generally F. SCorr FITZGERALD, THE DIAMOND AS BIG AS THE RITZ (Juniper
Grove 2008) (1922) (chronicling the discovery of a mountain consisting of one giant
diamond); MARILYN MONROE, DIAMONDS ARE A GIRL'S BEST FRIEND (Varese Records
2001) (1953) ("A kiss on the hand may be quite continental, but diamonds are a girl's
best friend."); FABOLOUS, DIAMONDS (Def Jam Records 2007) ("They should call me
Carrot Jeter, maybe Canary Bonds."); Blood Diamond (Warner Bros. Pictures 2006)
(portraying an enslaved miner who unearths an enormous pink diamond in a Sierra
Leone diamond mine).
169 See Paolo de Sa, Panel Chair, Opportunities and Constraints for Enhancing the
Development Potential from ASM: Views from Diamond Producing Countries (June 8,
2012), in NOTES ON THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 148, at 2.
170 SMILLIE, supra, note 11, at 28.
171 See id.
172 "[A]n agglomerate biotite-peridotite that occurs in pipes especially in southern
Africa and that often contains diamonds." Kimberlite, Merriam-Webster,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/kimberlite (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
173 SMILLIE, supra, note 11, at 28.
174 See id at 203 ("[T]he number of artisanal miners is enormous.").
175 See Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, High-Value Natural Resources,
Development, and Conflict: Channels of Causation, in HIGH-VALUE NATURAL
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"[s]ocial violence of every sort is rampant in mining towns and at
the digging sites .... Child labour is common, and most of the
miners, living completely outside the formal economy, are
vulnerable to just about every kind of predator."' 76 Accordingly,
the small-scale miners, or artisan miners, are forced to accept any
price from "middlemen who dominate the diamond marketing
chain" and enjoy grossly disproportionate bargaining power. 7 7
Aside from the ever-present danger of extortion, small-scale
miners are often ill-equipped and poorly trained, making small-
scale mining an inherently dangerous process.'7 ' As a result,
small-scale, alluvial diamond operations are plagued by an
estimated ninety times higher accident rate than large-scale mining
operations.179  The Faustian pact that emerges promises an
infinitesimally small chance at riches in exchange for an
extraordinarilly high probability of theft, serious injury, or
death.so Nevertheless, the expansion of alluvial diamond mining
is unyielding and generally anarchic.'8 '
The relentless growth of diamond mining is partially due to the
fact that diamonds are a highly fungible commodity; diamonds are
valuable, easily concealed, and highly transportable.'8 2 As a
result, "[v]irtually all of these [illicit] diamonds eventually find
their way into the legitimate trade.""' The informal and chaotic
alluvial diamond industry exists beyond the reaches of the KP,
despite its integral role in sustaining civil unrest and financing
RESOURCES AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING, supra note 23, at 297, 302.
176 SMILLIE, supra, note I1, at 203.
77 See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ARTISANAL DIAMOND
DEVELOPMENT PILOT PROGRAM, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, YEAR ONE PROGRESS
REPORT 1 (2008) [hereinafter PRADD YEAR ONE].
178 See Saleem Ali, Panelist, Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Building
Collaborative Relationships Between Artisanal Miners and Commercial-scale Mining
Enterprises (June 8, 2012), in NOTES ON THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 148, at 8.
179 See id.
180 See DIETRICH, supra note 83, at 6-7.
181 See PRADD YEAR ONE, supra note 177, at 18.
182 See BURBANK, supra note 26, at 1.
183 U.N. Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Counsel Resolution 1306
(2000), 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, Rep., transmitted by letter dated Dec. 19, 2000
from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. established pursuant to resolution
1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone addressed to the President of the Security Council,
para. 146, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1195 (Dec. 20, 2000).
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bloodshed.'84
Unlike copper, cobalt and oil that must be mined on an industrial
scale, requiring substantial investment and stability at the mine
site, alluvial diamonds can be mined in war zones with little or
no technology. They can be mined in militarily unstable terrain
that regularly changes hands between belligerents. Diamonds
have a relatively constant and internationally recognized price,
and they have a higher value-to-weight ratio than almost any
other substance. Diamonds are one of the most easily obtained,
most easily transported forms of hard currency, for state and
non-state actors alike. Inadequate controls in neighbouring
transit countries ... along with secrecy within the industry,
make diamonds-licit or illicit-easy to sell.'
Even those diamonds that eventually receive documentation
often exchange hands several times before reaching the purview of
the KP.' Many more receive forged documentation along the
way.187 Custom authorities, who are tasked with implementing the
KP documentation on the ground, are generally unable to identify
the originating source of an alluvial diamond.' As result, the
current procedure for regulating the trade of diamonds
"perpetuates exploitation and manipulation by unscrupulous
middlemen, and increases the potential for these diamonds to fuel
future conflict."' 89
VIII. Fostering Capitalism through Property Law
Many of the most active diamond producing states are
incapable of efficiently implementing KPCS measures.'90 The
regions producing vast amounts of alluvial diamonds are often
under rebel control, overlooked by overburdened authorities, or
exploited by corruption.19' Meanwhile, the vast majority of the
illicit diamond trade is shifting to non-state actors: small-scale
184 See BURBANK, supra note 26, at 3.
185 DIETRICH, supra note 83, at 2.
186 See Mitchell, supra note 48, at 196.
187 See id.
188 See PRADD YEAR ONE, supra note 177, at 18.
189 Id. at 1.
190 See BURBANK, supra note 26, at 3-4.
191 See id. at 4.
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alluvial miners. 9 2  Accordingly, the KP should shift the KPCS
focus from ineffective state actors to the individual miners.'9 3 This
methodology, notably, appears to call for individual self-
regulation.19 4 Yet, the KP can work to incentivize implementation
of KPCS measures by fostering a vehicle for miners to benefit. 9 5
The primary avenue to systematically incentivize KPCS
implementation is the reinforcement individual property rights.
A. Incentivizing Participation in the Legal Market
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto Polar (de Soto) is well-
known for his theory that the key to producing a strong market
economy is the development of a workable system for
documenting and enforcing private property rights.'9 6 His seminal
work The Mystery of Capital'9 7 theorizes that the absence of
adequately recorded land ownership rights precludes economic
development because individual assets "cannot readily be turned
into capital, cannot be traded outside of narrow local circles where
people know and trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for
a loan, and cannot be used as a share against an investment."' 9 8
De Soto is not alone: "[f]or decades, economists and development
specialists have argued that secured property rights are a
precondition for vibrant economic growth."' 99 The absence of a
uniform understanding of ownership prevents would-be
entrepreneurs from utilizing any assets they may have; the risk of
192 See DIETRICH, supra note 83, at 7.
193 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text (implying that state actors
would need to self-regulate because "KPCS membership and regulatory measures are
only recommendations;" thus, it follows that when the focus is individual miners, miners
are called to self-regulate).
195 See infra note 217 and accompanying text (arguing the need to focus on
incentive-based approach).
196 De Soto's recognitions include: Time magazine naming him one of the top five
leading Latin American innovators of the century; Forbes magazine labeling him one of
the fifteen innovators "who will re-invent your future;" and The Economist labeling his
institute as one of the top two think tanks in the world. Hernando de Soto's Biography,
CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/special/friedman/desoto/index.html (last visited Nov.
19, 2012).
197 HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000).
198 Id at 6.
199 SANDRA F. JOIREMAN, WHERE THERE Is No GOVERNMENT 8 (2011).
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ownership being challenged makes investment too risky.20 0 As a
result, a "new class of entrepreneurs with their own legal
arrangements" create extralegal markets.2 0' One such extralegal
market is the illicit diamond trade.202 As one economist reasoned:
This is the old Hobbesian problem: When most people obey the
law, the government can enforce it effectively and (relatively)
cheaply against the few individuals who break it. But when
obedience breaks down on a large enough scale, no authority is
strong enough to police everyone. In such a setting, with
enforcement becoming less and less effective, individuals have
an incentive to follow their own interests, regardless of any
203paper constraints.
The illicit diamond trade exemplifies a lapse of authority
producing counterproductive incentives.2 04 The KP could
effectively address the trade of illicit alluvial diamonds by
incentivizing participation in the legal market.
To begin, the fallacy that only money begets money must be
dispelled. Rather, the productive utilization of assets permits
earnings.205 Assets derive value from social consensus about their
potential legal uses. 2 06 For example, in many regions from which
conflict diamonds originate, a house may be little more than a
shelter.207 However, if formal property rights are recognized by
society, the house becomes a fungible asset.2 08 In the United
States, documented and defined property rights allow a mortgage
200 See DE SOTO, supra note 197, at 6.
201 Id. at 74.
202 See DIETRICH, supra note 83, at 7.
203 Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing
Property Rights, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 87, 88 (1996).
204 See Jeffrey Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey 13 (Harvard
Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWPl0-005, 2010) ("Where a
valuable resource such as oil or diamonds is there for the taking, rather than requiring
substantial inputs of labor and capital investment, factions are more likely to fight over
it."); accord DIETRICH, supra note 83, at 4 ("Informal commerce sustains the Congolese
population, which has simply retreated from state predation. The formal economy of the
country had ceased to function by the late 1980s.").
205 DE SOTO, supra note 197, at 64 ("Money does not earn money. You need a
property right before you can make money.").
206 See id. at 157.
207 See DIETRICH, supra note 83, at 4.
208 See DE SOTO, supra note 197, at 6.
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on an entrepreneur's house to be a critical resource for new
business development.209  This potential in capital has a positive
reciprocal effect-creating a vested interest in maintaining the
status quo.2 10  The same concept applies equally to mine
ownership. In essence, "[c]learly defined and enforced property
rights promote economic development and reduce violence." 2 1 1
Alternatively, without enforceable private property rights, "no
matter how many assets [people] accumulate or how hard they
work, most people will not be able to prosper."212 For example, de
Soto studied the economy of Port-au-Prince, Haiti during the
1990s and discovered extreme poverty and an "impenetrable wall"
preventing the majority of the surging urban population from
obtaining legal housing, engaging in formal business, or finding
legal employment. 213  This wall blocked two-thirds of the two
million Haitians from prospering despite their control of over $5.2
billion worth of tangible assets. 214 The barrier, however, persisted
because the assets were "dead capital"-unusable due to the
absence of clear ownership.2 15 Dead capital directly results from
the absence of private property rights.2 16
Many diamond-producing areas also face substantial obstacles
that have stalled economic development. Particularly within the
artisanal mining sector, which is highly informal,
entrepreneurialism is stifled by a failure to create an infrastructure
for incentive. 217  The failure stems primarily from inadequate
209 See id.
210 See id at 8.
211 JOIREMAN, supra note 199, at 153.
212 DE SOTO, supra note 197, at 159.
213 See id at 18.
214 De Soto calculates the value of "dead capital" through an algorithm that
operates, in part, by assigning values to informal urban dwellings and attributing it to its
possessors. See id at 253.
215 See id at 6-7.
216 See id. at 6.
217 See Steven Van Bockstael, Panelist, Best Practices and Lessons Learned in
Regards to ASM Formalization (June 8, 2012), in NOTES ON THE PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 148, at 5 ("[Alluvial mining] is driven by poverty, deagrarianization and multiplex
livelihoods. To increase the registration amount of formalized miners, there needs to be
a switch from an enforcement-based approach to an incentive-based approach.").
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enforcement of private property rights.2 1 8 Accordingly, any effort
to develop a formal business enterprise inevitably will fail because
the underlying assets are dead capital.2 19 The ultimate effect is
that, "[i]f the law does not help them, then they will help
themselves outside the law."2 2 o As such, to minimize extralegal
market participation, "states should devote serious attention and
resources to the enforcement of . .. property laws" in alluvial
diamond producing areas.221
B. "[P]roperty Rights that Are Not Enforceable Do Not
Exist"222
Secure property is not a luxury; it is a basic human right.223
However, the right is reduced to rhetoric without a means of
enforcement.2 24 Currently, no international forum exists which
allows individuals in post-conflict African states to invoke
property rights, but "there is a clear trend toward recognizing an
internationally enforceable right to property." 22 5
218 See Corene Crossin, Gavin Hayman, & Simon Taylor, Where Did It Come
From? Commodity Tracking Systems, in OPTIONS AND ACTIONS, supra note 120, at 97,
119 (discussing the benefits of a "reform of property rights to devolve management of
resources to local communities with a vested interest in their long-term security"); see
also Gregory Myers, Panel Chair, Going into Action (June 8, 2012), in NOTES ON THE
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 148, at 8 ("Communities have low incentives to formalize or
mine responsibility.").
219 See DE SOTO, supra note 197, at 6.
220 Id. at 168.
221 JOIREMAN, supra note 199, at 163.
222 Id. at 25.
223 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (Ill) A, art. 17,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone has the right to own property
alone as well as in association with others [and] shall [not] be arbitrarily deprived of his
property."); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX,
art. XXIII, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1 (1948), available at http://cidh.oas.org/
Basicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm ("Every person has a right to own
such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain
the dignity of the individual and of the home."); Organization of African Unity, African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.
5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) ("The right to property shall be
guaranteed.").
224 See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, RAYMOND R. COLETTA, & M.C. MIROw, GLOBAL
ISSUES IN PROPERTY LAW 12 (2006).
225 Id
916
2014 INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Admittedly, transforming any system of private property
ownership is a formidable goal. This is especially true in Africa,
where there are competing ideas about the meaning of property.226
Traditionally, the community owned most African land, and
individuals could possess a "usufruct," which only allowed the
individual to occupy and enjoy the land at a peripheral level.227
Thus, individuals were entitled only to their own creations,
whereas anyone in the community could take and utilize the land's
natural fruits. 228 Any ownership interests that might develop were
acknowledged by "visible, symbolic acts," such as the cultivation
of crops or the construction of a house.2 29
During British colonial rule in Africa, a quasi-customary
property law system developed that eroded already-delicate
individual property rights and shifted power to select local
leaders. 230 The system had lasting effects in creating a mammoth
wealth gap and isolated pockets of power and fortune.23 ' Today,
in most diamond-producing regions, "[m]any have poorly defined
property rights, an artifact of the colonial era. . . , [and] many
people who use or possess land have no legal proof that it is
theirs."232
C. Staking a Claim: Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond
Development
As early as 2000, the United States Agency for International
Development recognized the role of property rights in the illicit
diamond trade and initiated the Property Rights and Artisanal
226 See JOIREMAN, supra note 199, at 7.
227 SPRANKLING, COLETrA, & MIROW, supra note 224, at 59.
228 See id
229 Id. at 105.
230 Under the strategy of indirect rule, the British colonial administration selected
and empowered local leaders to carry out British objectives. See JOIREMAN, supra note
199, at 28.
231 See id. at 27-47.
232 Id at 9. This dynamic, however, is not present in all sub-Saharan African states.
In Ethiopia, for example, a comprehensive, modernized land tenure arrangement
developed following the 1974 revolution. Today, a unified system of property rights and
a formalized legal system has greatly extended the benefits of private property
ownership. See id. at 37-39.
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Diamond Development program (PRADD).2 33 The key focus of
PRADD, which was first implemented in 2007, was to
"demonstrate that by strengthening property rights: (1) Alluvial
diamonds will be brought into the formal chain of custody; and (2)
local benefits from production and marketing of alluvial diamonds
will increase."234
PRADD's first year of operation confirmed that property rights
need to be reinforced to control the anarchic expansion of illicit
alluvial diamond mining.235 The program issued a report outlining
its first operations, which bolstered the concern that legal systems
composed of poorly-defined, insecure property rights are
pervasive in alluvial diamond-mining regions:
All participants claim to be the property owners of the mines
they manage. Property rights were established by: Discovery of
diamonds (54%), inheritance (41%), purchase (5%), and
allocation by village chief (1%). Property right claims were
considered validated through local recognition of invested labor
(70%), verbal agreements with neighbors (21%), and the
discovery of diamonds (9%). The majority (95%) of
participants approve of the development of a public property
rights registry. Nineteen participants (14%) stated that their
claim was disputed by other parties ranging from smallholder
agriculturalists to international mining companies.236
The majority of participants, though claiming to own their mines,
also claim to be without any savings. 237  Though this dynamic
appears contradictory, the concepts of ownership and assets may
be mutually exclusive where the assets are "dead capital." 2 38 As a
result, control of a mine currently does not translate to any ability
to profit from its ownership.23 9
Furthermore, property rights cannot be sufficiently established
by mere recognition of possession by neighbors. Enforcement by
community recognition is quickly becoming obsolete: "as
233 See PRADD YEAR ONE, supra note 177, at iii.
234 Id. (emphasis in original).
235 See id at vi.
236 Id. at 7.
237 See id at 8.
238 See DE SOTO, supra note 197, at 16.
239 See PRADD YEAR ONE, supra note 177, at 8.
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communities [become] larger and more complex, and interaction
between the community and strangers more frequent, these
symbolic acts [lose] much of their value."2 4 0 In diamond-mining
areas, the interaction with outsiders is increasingly common and
complex, which furthers the need for a legitimate system of
property rights.2 4 1
Moreover, PRADD's report made clear that incentives to
participate in the legal market are paramount to effectively
regulating alluvial diamonds:
Without the proper incentives (secure property rights, fair
market prices), and in the absence of clear enforcement
regulations and implementation, there is little incentive for the
artisans and communities on whose land diamond mines occur
to provide better control and governance over these resources.
The present system perpetuates exploitation and manipulation
by unscrupulous middlemen, and increases the potential for
these diamonds to fuel future conflict, or become the focus of
future land grabbing and environmental degradation.242
The KP recognized the problem, as well as PRADD's
response, and acknowledged that these "effective internal controls
in alluvial mining areas are crucial to the overall effectiveness of
the [KPCS] in preventing conflict diamonds from entering the
legitimate diamond trade."24 3
While PRADD's emphasis on incentivizing participation in the
legal diamond trade by establishing clear and consistent mine
ownership claims is critical to the success of the KPCS, PRADD
will not be sufficient in itself. However, by utilizing and
integrating the PRADD methodology into the KPCS, the KP can
effectively address alluvial diamond mining by assigning
individual mine-origin information "tags" to property owners and
incorporating those tags into the KPCS.
240 SPRANKLING, COLETTA, & MIROW, supra note 225, at 105.
241 Indeed, alluvial diamond miners are seeing increasing contact with a variety of
actors, including mercenaries of multi-national private military and security companies
(PMCs). See Mathew Kincade III, Note, The Private Military Company Complex in
Central and Southern Africa: The Problematic Application of International
Humanitarian Law, 12 WASH. U. GLoB. STUD. L. REv. 205, 217 (2013).
242 See PRADD YEAR ONE, supra note 177, at 1.
243 KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 138, at 1.
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IX. Practical Obstacles to Systematically Defining Property
Rights
As of May 2012, PRADD had formalized and registered
individual property claims to 2,849 alluvial diamond mines in the
Central African Republic alone.244 The work improved the alluvial
diamond chain of custody and created corresponding incentives to
join the legal market.2 45 As such, legal diamond sales in regions
implementing PRADD systems have skyrocketed to nearly 4.5
times of what they were before PRADD's implementation, 2 46 and
average household incomes in PRADD areas have increased nine-
fold in one year.24 7
PRADD's successes have also reached beyond the diamond
trade. In another example of incentivizing entrepreneurship,
reinforced property rights allowed former miners to convert
destitute mines into legitimate, sustainable fish-farming
operations, increasing the number of fish-farms in the Central
African Republic from 18 to 5 80.248 In addition, property owners
have converted hundreds of other exhausted mines into vegetable
gardens or fruit tree orchards, and many former miners now earn
more income than they earned mining diamonds.2 49
PRADD's efforts to reinforce individual property rights had a
substantial, positive impact on the area by transforming formerly
dead capital into usable capital. But what are the costs of
implementation?
244 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ARTISANAL DIAMOND
DEVELOPMENT, USAID PROGRAM BRIEF 1-2 (2012) [hereinafter PRADD PROGRAM
BRIEF].
245 See S6bastien Pennes, Panelist, Knowledge-building and Financing for Efficient
ASM (June 8, 2012), in NOTES ON THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 148, at 4.
246 Id
247 See PRADD PROGRAM BRIEF, supra note 244, at 1.
248 See Terah De Jon, Panelist, Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Preventing
Environmental Damage to, and Facilitating Rehabilitation of, Artisanal Diamond Sites
(June 8, 2012), in NOTES ON THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 148, at 4.
249 See PRADD PROGRAM BRIEF, supra note 244, at 2.
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A. Cost-Efficient Property Registry Is Possible with the
Utilization ofExisting Technology.
KP observers have noted that "[fjormalization [of the alluvial
diamond mining industry] is too costly, but informality costs
miners even more money than formality because of harassment
and informal taxation."25 0 Undeniably, creating and implementing
an effective commodity-tracking system,2 5 ' like PRADD's
property registry, can be costly.252 However, by utilizing
accessible technology and maintaining a manageable plan, a
PRADD-based system offers a feasible, cost-effective means of
reinforcing property rights.
Unlike many suggested means of monitoring the illicit alluvial
diamond trade that focus on the diamond as a commodity in a top-
to-bottom approach, a mapped property rights registry focuses on
the means of production from a bottom-to-top perspective. An
example of the former is Gemprint, a sophisticated technology that
records and identifies the unique arrangement and relation of
facets in a diamond.25 3 The technology, however, is prohibitively
expensive and would be largely ineffective in the alluvial diamond
trade because its application is limited to polished diamonds.2 54
Moreover, not only would such systems require an extensive
database from which custom officials could compare and identify
diamonds, the technology is also novel and complex-making it a
frightening prospect for KP, which once "spent hours at one
meeting debating whether a [KPCS] certificate should be in
250 Dorothbe Gizenga, Panelist, Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Regards to
ASM Formalization, in NOTES ON THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 148, at 6.
251 Commodity-tracking systems provide a means to gain information, regulate, and
control trade in specific commodities. While the methodologies vary widely depending
on the targeted commodities, common traits of a successful system include: "common
definitions and reporting requirements, efficient reporting structure and effective
information exchange, commodity labeling and audited chain-of-custody arrangements,
effective compliance and enforcement measures, and capacity building." Corene
Crossin, Gavin Hayman & Simon Taylor, Where Did It Come From? Commodity
Tracking Systems, in OPTIONS AND ACTIONs, supra note 120, at 98.
252 See id. at 120-23 (comparing costs of ten CTS systems utilizing different
technological means to monitor timber production).
253 GEMPRINT, http://www.gemprint.com (last visited Oct. 10 2012). Diamonds,
like human fingerprints, are unique, making the Gemprint identification method similar
to fingerprinting. See id.
254 See SMILLIE, supra note 11, at 181.
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landscape or portrait format . . . ."255
Alternatively, a system that focuses on the means of
production from a bottom-to-top perspective, like PRADD, is cost-
efficient and relatively simple. PRADD began by investigating
current mine control and ownership256 and then worked to develop
a geo-referenced property rights claim registry. 257 Next, PRADD
assigned identifications to each mine that could be attached to any
diamond discovered there.2 58 Meanwhile, PRADD worked to
inform the miners by various means: (1) publicizing its intentions
through local radio, television, and press to raise awareness; (2)
holding various training sessions to teach diamond valuation,
discuss the legal implications of property ownership, and explain
the relationship between the miners and other actors in the
industry; (3) increasing miners' access to and understanding of
property rights information; and (4) collaborating with other
stakeholders, such as diamond collectors, local authorities, and
state authorities, to reinforce PRADD efforts.2 59 Ultimately, this
bottom-to-top approach formalized the means of diamond
production.
B. The Simplicity of a Geo-Referenced Property Rights Claim
Registry
In many areas affected by the illicit alluvial diamond trade,
there are few, if any, formal systems for registering and accessing
information on land titles or property division.2 60  Therefore,
PRADD resourcefully utilized an alternative source of land data-
satellite imagery. 261 The United States Geological Survey
provides PRADD with high-resolution satellite imagery.262 Using
this imagery, PRADD's staff identifies small-scale mining
operations and investigates ownership through partnerships in
255 Id. at 182.
256 See PRADD YEAR ONE, supra note 177, at 11.
257 See discussion infra notes 260-270
258 See PRADD YEAR ONE, supra note 177, at 11.
259 Id. at 13-14.
260 See discussion supra notes 56-94.
261 See PRADD YEAR ONE, supra note 177, at 11-14.
262 See id. at 13.
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local communities.2 63 Once a consensus regarding mine
ownership is reached, PRADD plots the exact location on a
geographic information system (GIS).2 64 Meanwhile, a unique
identification code is assigned to the mine and owner, which can
then be recorded on the government-issued KPCS certificates.26 5
The result is the first geo-referenced property rights registry that
gives miners a legitimate source to identify and defend their
property holdings.26 6
Accessibility to the information is unparalleled because
institutions and miners alike can use Google Earth267 to monitor
mining areas.268 PRADD increases the effectiveness by
conducting awareness-raising seminars and training sessions, as
well as incorporating local institutions as representatives for
enforcement of the registry.2 69 Potentially, PRADD could be
extended into a uniform property rights registry, which has had
considerable success in other nations.2 70
C. Aligning Interests to Finance Extended Implementation
The KP's collaborative structure places it in the unique
position to advance a PRADD-based system and incentivize legal
economic activity by aligning state, corporate, and individual
interests. Individuals gain from legal certainty, economic
opportunity, and community stability. 27 1 Corporations also favor
investing in sovereign, secure partners and gain from increased
stability.2 72 Moreover, increasing economic growth rates diminish
263 See id. at v.
264 See id. at 11.
265 See id. at 9.
266 See id. at 3 (Figure 1.1).
267 Google Earth is a virtual geographical information program that allows users to
utilize satellite imagery and aerial photography to view Earth. See GOOGLE EARTH,
http://www.google.com/earth/learn/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
268 Pete Chirico, Panelist, Knowledge-Building and Financing for Efficient ASM
(June 8, 2012), in NOTES ON THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 148, at 4.
269 See PRADD YEAR ONE, supra note 177, at 9.
270 See, e.g., SPRANKLING, COLETTA, & MIROW, supra note 225, at 116 (discussing
Her Majesty's Land Registry, the national land sale system in England and Wales).
271 See discussion supra 190-202.
272 For example, De Beers already engages in a 50/50 profit sharing plan with
Botswana and Namibia in order to help finance infrastructure development and resulting
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the risk of civil war and conflict by incentivizing the maintenance
of the status quo.2 73 As a corollary, states benefit not just from the
reduced risk of conflict, but also from a shift away from the
extralegal markets to legal, taxable markets.27 4
Indeed, the KP has recognized the need for KP participants
and donors to focus on "[providing] support for the establishment
of effective traceability systems for artisanal production ....
The KP also recently encouraged all participants to incorporate
practices similar to PRADD's GIS identification on "all invoices
and documentation accompanying the diamonds to the point of
export." 2 76 Yet, if the past decade has taught the KP anything, the
KP must realize that merely encouraging measures is insufficient.
Rather, the KP must work to implement a PRADD-based system
for registering diamond mines by refocusing foreign aid to regions
infected by illicit diamond production.
Through the so-called "resource curse," economists and social
commentators have long-recognized the pernicious phenomenon
by which a state's high concentration of a valuable natural
resource is often correlated with poor economic growth, economic
volatility, authoritarianism, corruption, and civil conflict.27 7 The
phenomenon is particularly striking in Africa:
Resource-related conflicts may pose special problems for the
states of Africa . . .. [C]onflicts in Africa, of all the world's
regions, show the most worrisome trends. Between 1992 and
2001 the number of armed conflicts outside of Africa dropped
by half, yet the number of conflicts in Africa stayed roughly the
same ... . Moreover, within Africa, armed conflicts have grown
stability. See DE BEERS, REPORT TO SOCIETY 21-22 (2011).
273 See Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 175, at 298 (discussing that the chance of
civil war increases proportionate to the proportion of a country's GDP that is derived
form the exportation of natural resource).
274 Taxes on diamond production are vital to the sub-Saharan economy. See
SMILLIE, supra, note 11, at 171 ("The diamond industry is vital to the South African and
the Southern African economy.") (quoting Press Release, De Beers, De Beers'
Comments on "The Heart of the Matter" (Jan. 26, 2000)).
275 KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 138, at 3.
276 See id. at 2.
277 See Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and
Economic Growth 21-22 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5398),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5398.pdf.
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more severe. 278
Economic theory submits that increased revenues from natural
resources have two perverse side-effects: (1) deindustrializing the
market economy by raising the exchange rate; and (2) detaching
revenue from industry and funneling it into the coffers of corrupt
leaders.279 Alarmingly, economists also associate these
debilitating ancillaries with foreign aid.280
The KP must lead in developing a cautious supply of foreign
aid conditioned on the implementation of PRADD-based property
systems. In post-conflict and struggling regions, domestic
authorities are largely dependent on foreign aid. 28 1  As such,
foreign assistance can be conditioned on specific measures,
permitting donors to exercise considerable control over the mode
of reform.282 Therefore, by orchestrating measured foreign
assistance, the KP can increase the returns on aid, while
simultaneously shifting returns on natural resources to individual
economic participants.28 3 In turn, improving access to legitimate
sources of capital, primarily through a formalized property rights
system, incentivizes participation in the legal economy while
decreasing the appeal of joining the illicit diamond trade.
X. Conclusion
Going forward, the KP must gain legitimate force if it is to
implement a more effective response to the pervasive dilemmas
caused by illicit alluvial diamonds trading. The KP realizes that
the current measures are failing. Key to implementing lasting
change is its ability to establish a dependable system of property
278 See Michael Ross, The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You
Poor, in OPTIONS AND ACTIONS, supra note 120, at 17.
279 See generally Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 175, at 303-08 (discussing the
"Dutch Disease" and the adverse effects of immense resources in areas with poor
infrastructure).
280 See id at 304.
281 See Siri Aas Rustad et al., Building or Spoiling Peace? Lessons From the
Management of High-value Natural Resources, in HIGH-VALUE NATURAL RESOURCES
AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING, supra note 23, at 599.
282 See id
283 See Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 175, at 309 ("Policy coherence demands that
the international community focus on raising the returns from natural resource revenues,
just as it has struggled to raise the returns on aid.").
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rights. Reinforcing property rights incentivizes economic growth
from the ground up by facilitating the creation of capital while
disincentiving illicit activity.
Despite obstacles, a relatively simple approach utilizing
already-prevalent and inexpensive technology presents the most
viable path to increasing individual access to legitimate income.
By tying foreign aid to the implementation of programs with
demonstrated success in this arena, such as PRADD, the KP can
foster economic growth from the ground up.
